default.html.twig template not found for page: /resources/legal-not-so-eze/august-2025Appellant was convicted of violating Minn. Stat. § 609.667(3), for possessing a firearm assembled from parts of other firearms or kits but that did not have a serial number. Appellant argues that section 609.667(3) is unconstitutional, but both the district court and Court of Appeals disagree.
Section 609.667(3) specifically prohibits the possession of “a firearm that is not identified by a serial number.” The Second Amendment protects the right to “keep and bear arms,” but this right is not unlimited. A firearms regulation must, however, be “part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 19 (2022).
The court points to various historical analogues to section 609.667(3), which “demonstrate that the process of marking or otherwise recording ownership of a firearm was a practice used by and known to people contemporaneous with the nations’ founding” and strongly indicates section 609.667(3) fits within the category of firearm regulations that are consistent with Second Amendment principles. Thus, the statute does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to Appellant’s possession of a privately made firearm without a serial number. State v. Jones, A24-1249, 25 N.W.3d 732 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2025).
After being found with a “ghost gun,” a pistol assembled from purchased parts, Appellant was charged with possession of a firearm without a serial number, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.667(3). The pistol is not required by state or federal law to have a serial number. The district court dismissed the charge, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court holds that section 609.667(3) criminalizes possession of a firearm without a serial number only if federal law requires the firearm to have a serial number.
Section 609.667 specifically references federal law, providing that a serial number is the number required by 26 U.S.C. § 5842, for the identification of firearms. Minnesota does not have its own firearm serial number requirements, the State put forth no alternative meanings for “serial number,” and the generic dictionary definitions are “too broad and amorphous” to be reasonable. Thus, the federal serial number requirements apply.
As the firearm possessed by Appellant was not the type of firearm required by federal law to have a serial number, Appellant’s possession of the firearm did not violate section 609.667(3). State v. Vagle, A23-0863, 24 N.W.3d 481 (Minn. Aug. 6, 2025).
Appellant was charged with felony theft by swindle after obtaining various sums of money from the victim to start an electric vehicle services company. The jury was provided with a special interrogatory on the guilty verdict form, asking if the jury had found the value of the money was more than $35,000. The jury found Appellant guilty of theft by swindle but found the value of the swindled money was less not more than $35,000. The district court interpreted the verdict as a misdemeanor and sentenced Appellant accordingly.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the jury’s finding as to the swindled money’s value rejected an essential element of the crime charged. In relevant portion, Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(4), provides that it is theft to, “by swindling, whether by artifice, trick, device, or any other means, obtain[] property or services from another person.” A felony-level sentence is authorized for the theft by swindle of property or services valued at more than $35,000, while a misdemeanor-level sentence is authorized if the property or services are valued at less than $500. Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3.
Case law has established three elements for theft by swindle: (1) obtaining another’s property, (2) through “affirmative fraudulent or deceitful behavior,” and (3) with “the intent to defraud.” State v. Flicek, 657 N.W.2d 592, 597-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). None of these elements relate to the value of the property obtained. The property value must still be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but only for sentencing purposes.
The evidence here was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for theft by swindle and, because the jury found the State did not prove the value of the money obtained was more than $35,000, the district court properly imposed a misdemeanor sentence. State v. Marth, A24- 1268, 25 N.W.3d 911 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2025).
Appellant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm while under 18 years old. The charge came after police found a firearm on Appellant’s person during a pat-frisk. Police responded to a report of a person pointing a handgun at people at a light rail station when they saw the suspect inside a pizza restaurant, near three or four other people, including Appellant. The district court found police had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe Appellant may be armed. After a stipulated facts trial, Appellant was found guilty, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
A pat-frisk is permissible if police have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous and criminal activity may be afoot, based on the totality of the circumstances. However, the Supreme Court has previously held that mere proximity to or association with a person previously engaged in criminal activity is insufficient. See State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 844 (Minn. 2011).
Here, the district court’s finding that the original suspect was huddled and conversing with a group including Appellant was clearly erroneous, as it was not supported by any evidence in the record. Thus, the only facts to support the pat-frisk were Appellant’s proximity to the suspect and police officers’ “training and experience that weapons can be passed off to another person in a group to evade detection.” These facts were insufficient to create a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the pat-frisk of Appellant. Thus, the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the handgun. Reversed and remanded. Matter of Welfare of C.T.B., A23-0459, 24 N.W.3d 651 (Minn. Aug. 13, 2025).
Appellant was convicted of first-degree domestic-abuse murder and arson. He was sentenced to life in prison for murder and a consecutive 57 months for arson. The district court imposed a consecutive sentence for arson under Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 4, without a sentencing jury. Appellant argues this violated Blakely, which “held that a judge cannot impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on facts not found by a jury, because doing so violates a defendant’s right to a trial by jury.”
In Minnesota, the maximum sentence that may be imposed solely on the basis of facts reflected in a jury verdict or admitted by the defendant is the presumptive guideline sentence. Generally, where a defendant’s conduct violates multiple criminal laws, they may be sentenced for only one of them. Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1. However, Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 4, includes one exception to this rule and permits sentences for multiple offenses where one is arson committed for the purpose of concealing another crime.
Here, the district court found Appellant guilty of both first-degree murder and arson, found that Appellant committed arson for the purpose of concealing the murder under section 609.035, subd. 4, and imposed a guideline sentence for both offenses. Neither sentence exceeded the sentencing guidelines and the district court finding of fact determined only whether a sentence could be imposed under section 609.035, sub. 4. Thus, Appellant’s right to a jury under Blakely was not implicated. State v. Bilbro, A24-0861, 24 N.W.3d 827 (Minn. Aug. 20, 2025).
Following Appellant’s trial on charges of criminal sexual conduct, domestic assault, and threats of violence, the jury informed the court it was potentially deadlocked. One juror then learned they were exposed to COVID-19, causing concern that continued deliberations with an exposed juror could pressure the jurors to reach a unanimous verdict to minimize exposure. The court declared a mistrial on all counts and later denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss the charges on Double Jeopardy grounds. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Jeopardy generally attaches when a jury is impaneled and sworn, which then prevents a defendant from being tried again for the same offense(s). However, following a mistrial, a retrial is permissible over a defendant’s objection “if there was manifest necessity for terminating the first trial.” A retrial after a mistrial with a defendant’s consent is allowed “unless the government intentionally induced, goaded, or provoked the defendant into asking for the mistrial.”
Here, Appellant asked for, and thereby consented to, a mistrial on all counts. There is no evidence the court goaded, induced, or provide Appellant into requesting the mistrial. Thus, double jeopardy has not attached, and Appellant may be retried. State v. Lerma, A23-0947, 25 N.W.3d 40 (Minn. Aug. 27, 2025).
Appellant was placed on probation in 1998 after pleading guilty to third-degree assault, a “crime of violence.” When discharged from probation in 2000, the discharge order informed him he was not entitled to possess firearms for ten years, consistent with the then-existing version of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 3. In 2003, this statute was amended to impose a lifetime firearm possession prohibition for those convicted of a crime of violence. In 2021, Appellant was arrested and found to be in possession of a firearm. He ultimately pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. He filed a postconviction petition challenging the conviction, but his petition was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court rejects Appellant’s argument that his due process rights were violated because the 2000 discharge order informed him of only a ten-year firearm possession ban, not the subsequently promulgated lifetime firearm ban. No government official actively misled Appellant as to his legal obligations with respect to firearm possession. While the law was amended after Appellant was discharged from probation, ignorance of the law is no excuse.
The court also rejects Appellant’s argument that his guilty plea was invalid because he did not admit to knowledge of his ineligibility status at the time he possessed the firearm. Section 624.713, subd. 1(2) prohibits any person “who has been convicted of… a crime of violence” from possessing ammunition or firearms. Knowledge of ineligibility is not explicitly required by the statute.
The legislature did not clearly express an intent to create a strict liability offense under section 624.713, subd. 1(2). Therefore, the court imputes a mens rea requirement to the offense. Given the statutory language, which does not mention ineligibility status, the court holds that ineligibility is not a fact of which a defendant must have knowledge to be convicted. Instead, the State must prove the defendant knew of his or her previous conviction of a crime of violence. Appellant admitted he knew of his 1998 crime of violence conviction, so his conviction is affirmed. Underwood v. Underwood, A23-1524, 25 N.W.3d 26 (Minn. Aug. 27, 2025).