default.html.twig template not found for page: /resources/legal-not-so-eze/august-2026Respondent was charged with felony impersonation of a peace officer under Minn. Stat. § 609.4751. Subdivision 3 of that section enhances the offense to a felony if it is committed within five years “of a previous violation of this section.” Minn. Stat. 609.4751, subd. 3. The State used pending charges relating to another allegation of impersonating a peace officer to enhance Respondent’s charge to a felony. The district court dismissed the felony charge, finding the State did not establish a prior violation, interpreting “violation” to mean conviction or adjudication. The State appealed.
The Court of Appeals notes that, while section 609.4751 does not define “violation” or “violate,” “violate” is defined in section 645.44, subd. 17, and that definition specifically applies to all other Minnesota statutes “unless another intention clearly applies.” Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subds. 1, 17. Section 645.44, subd. 17, defines “violate” as “failure to comply with.” Consistent with section 645.44, subd. 17, the court concludes that “violation,” as used in section 609.4751, subd. 3, is not limited to a conviction or adjudication of guilt. A “violation” of section 609.4751 includes a “failure to comply with” the terms of that section.
Here, there was probable cause for the charge of felony impersonation of a peace officer and the district court erred by dismissing that charge for lack of probable cause. Reversed and remanded. State v. Mattson, A26-0109, 2026 WL 2386468 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2026).
Without first holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Appellant’s petition to vacate his second-degree unintentional felony murder conviction under the Act of May 19, 2023 (the Act), ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 801, 864-68. The Act provides possible relief for those convicted of certain types of felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory of liability. A petition under the Act may be denied “if additional information or submissions establish that there is not a reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s petition, but the Supreme Court reverses, finding that the Court of Appeals applied an improper reasonable-probability standard.
The Court of Appeals found that “reasonable probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.” Based on this definition, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary because Appellant’s “entitlement to relief was refuted by the record.”
In March 2026, the Supreme Court clarified the reasonable-probability standard in the context of a preliminary application under the Act, rather than a petition to vacate a conviction under the Act. State v. Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d 847 (Minn. 2026). Zielinski held that there is a reasonable probability that an applicant is entitled to relief if their preliminary application “allege[s] facts that would cause a rational person to believe that at an evidentiary hearing, the applicant might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that” they are entitled to relief. Id. at 858. The Court holds that this reasonable-probability standard also applies to a denial of a petition under the Act, given that the Act uses the same “reasonable probability” language in both the provision governing preliminary applications and the provision governing petitions.
Thus, the Supreme Court holds that a district court may deny a petition without an evidentiary hearing if “[t]here is not a reasonable probability that the petitioner is entitled to have their conviction vacated,” that is, “if the additional information or submissions submitted at the petition stage would cause no rational person to believe that, at an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they are entitled to relief under the Act.” The reasonable-probability standard applied by the Court of Appeals in this case is materially different from this standard. The matter is reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to apply the proper standard itself or to remand to the district court for it to apply that standard. Grant v. State, A24-1908, 2026 WL 2444348 (Minn. Aug. 19, 2026).
Appellant was convicted of aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder in 1994 and completed his sentence for that conviction in 2017. He was convicted of second-degree intentional murder in 2023, for which he is currently serving a prison sentence. In 2026, Appellant filed a preliminary application under the Act to vacate his 1994 felony murder conviction, which was summarily denied by the district court because Appellant was not in custody for the 1994 conviction at the time of his application.
The Court of Appeals finds the district court abused its discretion and reverses. A preliminary application under the Act may be filed by an individual convicted of a qualifying felony murder offense “who is in the custody of the commissioner of corrections or under court supervision…” The Act permits the district court to summarily deny a preliminary application if, among other reasons, “the applicant is not in the custody of the commissioner of corrections or under court supervision.” Neither provision requires the custody or court supervision to be for the conviction from which relief is sought, and the court declines to read such language into the Act.
As Appellant was in the custody of the commissioner of corrections at the time of his preliminary application under the Act, the district court erred in summarily denying his preliminary application on the ground that he was not in custody for his prior qualifying felony-murder conviction. Edmondson v. State, A25-2059, 2026 WL 2469849 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2026).
When police attempted to stop Respondent’s vehicle on a highway to investigate a suspected license plate violation, Respondent turned on his hazards and continued driving for several miles. Respondent eventually stopped off of the highway and was charged with felony fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. The district court denied Respondent’s motion to suppress evidence of his flight, rejecting his argument that the stop was unconstitutional and his flight resulted from that violation. A jury found him guilty and, although the Court of Appeals found the traffic stop was unlawful, it affirmed Respondent’s conviction because evidence of Respondent’s flight need not be suppressed. The Supreme Court granted review as to one issue: whether evidence of a defendant’s vehicular flight in response to an unconstitutional traffic stop must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
The Supreme Court accepts that the traffic stop was unconstitutional as it was not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Evidence obtained as a result of that constitutional violation was evidence of a new crime—vehicular flight from police. The Supreme Court clarifies “that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine applies even when a suspect commits a new crime in response to law enforcement’s constitutional violation,” and holds that “[i]n considering whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence of the new crime, courts must determine whether the evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree by applying the four-factor attenuation test.” This test requires the court to consider: “(1) the purpose of and flagrancy of the misconduct, (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, (3) whether it is likely that the evidence would have been obtained in the absence of the illegality, and (4) the temporal proximity of the illegality and the evidence alleged to be the fruit of the illegality.”
Applying this test to Respondent’s case, the court finds that the first factors two weigh against suppressing evidence of Respondent’s flight and the second two weigh in favor of suppression. However, when considering and balancing all factors together, the court finds Respondent’s flight was not fruit of the poisonous tree because it was sufficiently attenuated from the unconstitutional stop: the stop was not calculated to produce the flight, the officer’s conduct “was not so flagrant as to weigh strongly in favor of suppression,” and Respondent’s flight “was an act that purged the taint of the unlawful stop.” The Court of Appeals is affirmed. State v. Engel, A24-0271, 2026 WL 2444392 (Minn. Aug. 19, 2026).
Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of felony domestic assault. He was charged with brandishing a knife at his fiancé, threatening her, throwing her to the ground, and slapping her face. The jury instructions explained Appellant was guilty if the jury unanimously found either that he “committed an act with intent to cause [his fiancé] to fear immediate harm or death” or “intentionally inflicted bodily harm upon [his fiancé].” In closing argument, over the defense’s objection, the prosecutor told the jury they did not need to unanimously decide which of the two types of domestic assault Appellant committed to find him guilty of domestic assault.
The Court of Appeals finds the prosecutor misstated the law on jury unanimity and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury unanimity requirement, rooted in constitutional due process rights, allows a jury to find a defendant guilty only when “it unanimously finds that the government has proved each element of the offense.” State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn. 2002). Unanimity is not always required to “decide which of several possible means the defendant used to commit the offense in order to conclude that an element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
Domestic assault can be committed through causing fear of immediate bodily harm or death or intentionally inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1. The court clarifies that these two types of domestic assault are separate offenses consisting of different elements, rather than different means of committing domestic assault. Thus, a jury may not find a defendant guilty of domestic assault-fear or domestic assault-harm unless it does so unanimously. As the prosecutor in this case told the jury otherwise, she materially misstated the law. The court finds the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, reverses Appellant’s conviction, and remands for a new trial. State v. Harper, A25-1443, 2026 WL 2560697 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2026).